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Abstract
Three models of a monetary economy are considered, in order to
show the effects of a gold demonetization: the first with a gold money,
the second with demonetized gold but no central bank, and the third
with demonetized gold, but with a central bank. The distinctions
between ownership and control are discussed.
JEL Listings: C72, E50, E58
Keywords: Gold demonetization, Gold backed paper, Reserves
1 Money and Transactions
In this essay a series of simple examples is employed to show the relationship
between gold and fiat money. Specifically, we study the opening up of an
economy to government control via the invention of symbolic money and the
demonetization of gold.
We consider three elementary one-period models of money lending. The
first represents a simple two-perishable-good economy before a gold demone-
tization. It has gold as the money, no central bank, but has individuals who
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act as money lenders (“merchant banks” or “individually owned banks”).
The second model considers the effects of a demonetization. The transaction
use of gold is replaced by paper.1 All holders of gold are given on a one-
to-one basis paper money (but are allowed in addition to keep their gold).
In the third model, when gold is demonetized the same amount of paper is
issued as in the second model; but it is issued to a central bank instead of
to the individuals. As the individuals own the central bank, there has been
no change in ownership, just in control that may or may not be justified in
terms of expertise and professional role.
All three models are strategic market games, in which there are markets
for the two perishable goods; in addition, if it is demonetized, there is a
market for gold as well.
Finally, we treat all markets as “buy-sell”, rather than “sell all.”2 The one
exception is at the end of our discussion of the first, “pre-demonetization”
model, where we also compute a sell-all version, in order to illustrate the
considerable difference that a change in trading technology can make to the
economic distribution.
Our results show a gain in efficiency (in the case of “enough money”)
when a switch is made from a durable commodity money to a fiat money.
This is due to players being able to enjoy both the full service value of
gold and transactions value of money – something that cannot be done in
the original model with gold money. When we further add in the central
bank, there is a somewhat further efficiency gain in the case of “not enough
money”; we close the paper with a discussion of the usefulness of central
banks.
2 A Playable Game
As the level of abstraction here is so high, it is perhaps useful to consider the
one period model as an experimental game that could be played in a gaming
laboratory. This helps to clarify the problem of representing an open ended
activity that has a history, a future, and “fuzzy” society driven rules, by a
finite model that has a well defined beginning, end, and formal rules. In
1We use the term“paper” to stand for any form ofsymbolic money with no intrinsic
worth as a comodity.
2A sell-all model of a market is where traders must put all of their initial endowments
of goods up for sale, and then buy back all that they wish to consume. It is the simplest
price forming mechanism one can construct. In contrast, in the more complex buy-sell
model, individuals may choose how much to sell at the market (and then buy back any
amount). See Shubik (1999) for a full discussion.
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particular, both initial and terminal conditions must be defined. The initial
conditions cause few difficulties — they are just the “initial endowments” that
are given in many economic models. The terminal conditions are another
matter. In a  period model we can regard period  + 1 as a “settlement
day” — all accounts are closed, all positions are wound down, and the books
are balanced.
Much of economic theory deals with the infinite horizon in either one
or both directions. How to balance the books at “infinity” is a well known
problem. If one postulates a condition such as rational expectations, at the
point of equilibrium the books can be balanced. However no information is
supplied about what happens out of equilibrium. In an experimental game
(and in actual liquidations) such information must be supplied.
In an experimental game the earning of the subjects may depend not
merely on their earnings per period, but also upon the evaluation of the
assets left over on the day of settlement. Here we have  = 1; hence set-
tlement is at the second period. There are no problems with evaluation of
perishables at that time, as they will not exist.3 However, there are prob-
lems evaluating any durables left over, such as goods, financial instuments
and institutions that are owned. This is addressed in our models below.
3 Model 1: Competitive Lending with Gold as the
Money
We first consider a one-period, buy-sell economy:
3.1 Model 1a: Buy-Sell
There are three player types: two types of traders, as well as moneylenders.
For the traders, there is a continuum of each type. The traders trade in two
perishable goods using a gold money, each with the same utility function
(  ) = 2
√
++Πb. Here  is the amount of the first good consumed,
 is the amount of the second good consumed,  is the amount of gold services
consumed, and b is the amount of gold owned at the end of the game.4 Hence
3 If a production process at time  = 1 yields a perishable one period later, then we would
have to evaluate the possibility of left over perishable at the end of the game. Structuraly
this is feasible, but only errors or pathological behavior would call forth residual perishables
if the salvage value were zero.
4For the purpose at hand (namely the study of the demonetization of gold and the
introduction of fiat), utilizing a linear separable term for gold in the utility function
presents no restriction. Meanwhile, there is a benefit in that it simplifies considerably the
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the first term is the utility derived from the consumption of perishables, the
second is from the service value of gold, and the last is from the worth of
gold at the end of the game (the parameter Π is the per-unit salvage value
for gold5).
Traders of Type 1 have a total initial endowment of  of good 1, none
of good 2, and  units of the gold money; we write these endowments as
( 0). Type 2 traders have (0 ). Hence one would expect that in
this model Type 1 traders would want to exchange some of their “Good 1”
for Type 2 traders’ “Good 2”. If there are no transactions costs to trade,
then the competitive, general equilibrium level of consumption6 is for both
trader types to end up consuming 2 of each good, plus  units of gold
service during the period, plus the terminal value of the ownership of 
units of gold. Thus each type would obtain a utility “score” of  from the
consumption of the goods, plus  for the gold services consumed, plus Π
from the terminal worth of  units of gold.7 This compares with a score of
0 ++Π for each type from its initial bundle.
However, the rules of the game require that all trade is intermediated
with money. Thus, efficient trade can only take place when the traders are
in a position to borrow gold if they do not initially have enough to buy
the perishables. We introduce a third agent type, a continuum of perfectly
competitive moneylenders who start with an initial supply  of gold and no
other commodities They too have the same utility functions as the traders.
We work with strategic variables. A strategy for a trader  of Type 1
is denoted by (  ), where 1 is the amount he bids for Good 2, 

is the amount of his own Good 1 that he puts up for sale, and  is the
amount of loan to be paid back to the moneylenders.8 In what follows,
we assume that all of the traders of Type 1 are identical, facing the same
utility maximization problems and so acting identically; hence we may also




total amount of money bid for good 2, summed across all Type 1 agents,
mathematics involved in the analysis.
5 It is more consistent with the mathematics to regard Π as a parameter of the system
standing for the expected utility of the durable gold at the end of a one period experimental
game, In dynamic programming terms it is the salvage value, or it can be regarded as the
valuation of any assets left over at the day of final settlement.
6Needless to say, this outcome is also Pareto efficient.
7We are using  here to stand both for the stock and flow of gold. More properly
we could use  and ̇, however as they always have a 1 : 1 relationship we allow the
sloppier notation as the meaning should be clear from context. See Quint-Shubik (200x)
for details.
8Thus the amount actually borrowed by  is 

1+





 = the total amount of Good 1 offered for sale, also summed across
all Type 1 agents, and  =
R

 = the total amount of loan to be paid back
by the Type 1 traders to the moneylenders. For now on, we will use this
“aggregate” convention for strategies — if one wishes to recover an individual
trader’s strategy from (  ), all one needs to do is to divide through by
the measure of the set of Type 1 traders. We believe this convention for
strategies will help make the overall presentation easier to follow.9
For further simplicity, we assume that borrowing is essentially instanta-
neous followed by trade. Thus, when the lenders lend gold, they lend it for
the whole period, to be paid back at the “settlement time” at the end of the
period.10
We assume that the measure of the set of traders of either type, as well
as that of the set of lenders, is 1.11



















− +  − 
¶
(1)
Here the parameters  and  are the prices for the two goods,  is the interest
rate on loans, and Π is the per unit salvage value parameter for the gold
money.12 Thus, the first term above is the utility of consumption of the
perishables, the second the utility from the service value of gold over the
period, and the last term the salvage value of gold. We remark that a more
precise model here would also include a default penalty term, but here we
assume that default penalties are so great that the traders are essentially
forbidden to go bankrupt.
9The reader will also note that the quantity  defined before is really a total amount
of money initially owned by the continuum of traders, i.e.  =

, where  repre-
sents the amount of money initially held by trader . Similarly,  denotes the aggregate
endowment of perishable across the continuum of individuals.
10See Quint and Shbuik (200x) for a detailed discussion of the distinction between
consumption and transactions use of gold.
11Realistically the measures sould be of the order of 10,000:1 or more depending upon
he society.
12 If the economy were stationary then we could imagine a discount rate  for which
Π = 













− +  −  ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (3)
  ≥ 0, 0 ≤  ≤  (4)
The constraint () is the cash flow constraint, i.e., the requirement that
there must be enough cash on hand to make all bids. The constraint () is
the budget constraint, i.e., the requirement that all debts must be paid back
at the end of the game.




























− ̄+ ̄̄ − ̄ ≥ 0 ()
̄ ̄ ≥ 0 0 ≤ ̄ ≤ 
where the notation should be apparent.
The lenders in this model are private capitalists. They lend but do not
accept deposits. Since they act both as consumers and as moneylenders,
their decision variables are ∗1 (the total amount bid by lenders for good 1),
∗2 (the total amount bid by lenders for good 2), and  (the total amount of
gold lent to traders). Since there is a continuum of lenders, these variables
represent aggregations of identical individual lenders’ strategies, much as
the traders’ variables do.













+ ( − ∗1 − ∗2 − ) +Π ( − ∗1 − ∗2 + ) (5)
s.t.  − ∗1 − ∗2 −  ≥ 0 (6)
∗1 
∗
2  ≥ 0 (7)
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while that for the interest rate is





In Appendix A, we solve the model for two cases. First, in “Case 1,” the
traders begin with little gold but the lenders have a lot, i.e.  is small and
 is large. This gives tight cash flow and budget constraints for the traders,
but loose cash flow constraints for the lenders. In “Case 2”, both  and
 are small — and so all constraints for both traders and lenders are tight.
The two cases above allow us to consider set values of  and Π (namely
 = 0 and Π = 1), while allowing  to range over an interval of values.
The dividing line between Case 1 and Case 2 is where  = 2.
In both cases, we shall see that the money interest rate is always at least
one. This reflects the marginal value of consumption of the services of gold,
which is 1. When gold is in short supply, the interest rate increases from 1,
reflecting the intensity of the shortage.
Finally, in both cases, we note that the consumption levels of the per-
ishables is not Pareto efficient.13
Example 1
If  = 2, we are in Case 1 above. Our calculations yield  =  = 12,
 = 1,  =  = 4,  =  = 8,  =  = 2, and the money lenders
lend  = 4. Hence the consumption by each trader type is 2 of “their
own” perishable, and 4 of the “other” perishable. The bids of the money
lenders are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 8, and so the consumption of the money lenders is


































13 In our models, consumption of perishables is Pareto efficient iff each of the three types
of consumer (i.e., the two trader types and the lenders) consume equal amounts of Good
1 and Good 2.
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Suppose there were far less gold in the system, let us limit it to  = ;
the solution will differ from Example 1 only in the payoff for the money








+Π() = 2. We are still in Case
1.
Example 3
Suppose there were still less gold in the system, let it be  = 4; this
now puts us into “Case 2” from the analysis in Appendix A. Now we have
 =  = 14,  = 3,  =  = 8,  =  = 32,  =  = 2, and the
money lenders lend  = 16. Hence the consumption by each trader type
is 2 of “their own” perishable, and 8 of the “other” perishable. The
bids of the money lenders are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 332, and so the consumption of
the money lenders is 38 of each of the perishables. The final distribution














) The utilities to the two






+ 0 = 
2









) = . The interest rate  = 3 is above 1 to reflect the
shadow price of the shortage of gold.
3.3 Model 1b: Sell-All
Here we consider a sell-all version of Model 1a. Now, when traders come to
the perishable goods’ market, they must first sell off all of their endowments,
and then buy back all they consume. Since they are selling and buying more,
their need for money increases.
The notation for the model is similar to that of Model 1a, except for the
traders’ decision variables. For trader type 1, they are 1 (the total amount
bid for perishable good #1, summed over all type 1 traders), 2 (the amount
bid for perishable good #2, again summed over all type 1 traders), and 
(as in Model 1a, the total amount of loan to be paid back to the lenders).
Note that we no longer have  as a strategic variable, because the amount
of perishables put up for sale is no longer a decision.























− 1 − 2 + −  ≥ 0 () (budget constraint)(13)
1 2  ≥ 0 (14)
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There is a similar optimization for the traders of Type 2, with decision














+ ( − ∗1 − ∗2 − ) +Π ( − ∗1 − ∗2 + ) (15)
s.t.  − ∗1 − ∗2 −  ≥ 0 (16)
∗1 
∗
2  ≥ 0 (17)















In Appendix B, we solve the model for the special case where  is small.
We again have two cases, depending up whether constraint (∗) is tight —
for high values of  (Case 1) it is not, while for low values of  (Case 2) it
is. The operational differences between Models 1a and 1b can be illustrated
by comparing the same set of three examples, all with Π = 1 and  = 0.
We note that with sell-all, the dividing line between Case 1 and Case 2 falls
at a higher value of , namely  = .
Also, note that in both cases the consumption of perishables is Pareto
efficient. This contrasts with the buy-sell model, in which it was never
efficient.
Example 1
Suppose  = 2. Our calculations (in Case 1) yield 1 = 2 = ̄1 = 2 =
8,  =  = 12,  = 1,  =  = 2, and the money lenders lend  = 2.
Hence the consumption by each trader type is 4 of both perishables. The
bids of the money lenders are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 4 and so the consumption of
the money lenders is 2 of each of the commodities. The final distribution












 2). The utilities to the two















+ +Π(2) = 4.
Example 2
Suppose there were far less gold in the system, let us limit it to  = .
Now we are at the dividing line between Case 1 and Case 2, so we can
use either to compute the variable values. We obtain the same values as







+0+Π = 2. In this example when  =  there is precisely enough
money to not constrain lending.
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Example 3
Suppose there were still less gold in the system, let it be  = 4; now
we are in the interior of Case 2. We obtain 1 = 2 = ̄1 = 2 = 128,
 =  = 18,  = 7,  =  = 8, ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 764, and the money lenders
















Finally, we note the high value of  — this reflects the high shadow price
of the shortage of gold.
3.5 A comparison of Models 1a and 1b
We may glean several key properties of a commodity money from these
models, and from other models appearing elsewhere.
1. The key idea associated with “enough money”14 is that the price of
the rental of gold money () should be exactly its consumption value
(which is 1 here).
2. Although “enough money” is a well defined concept, the precise math-
ematical conditions depend upon the institutional details of trade. The
difference between the monetary requirements of the buy-sell and the
sell-all models illustrates this.
3. Not only is the specific mechanism relevant, but so too is the speed of
operation. If used in trade, the commodity money is unavailable for
the whole period for consumption purposes. Quint and Shubik (2005)
examine the influence of time-in-trade in detail.
4. The above examples show that a commodity money’s elasticity of de-
mand (as a commodity) plays a role. This aspect of utilizing a com-
modity that does not enter the utility function in a separable form has
been studied in detail by Dubey and Shapley (1994).
5. When a commodity money is borrowed, even in a stationary economy,
the rate of interest is strictly higher than the money’s consumption
value. This introduces a wedge between buying and selling prices in
the buy-sell model (or any model where the individual controls her
offer). This wedge does not appear in the sell-all model.
14By “enough money”, we mean the case where there is enough money in the economy
to finance efficient trade of the perishables. In Models 1a and 1b above, the “enough
money” case is Case 1. See Quint-Shubik (xxxx) for details.
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3.6 An aside on enough commodity money
The selection of a commodity money depends upon physical properties, such
as portability, cognizability, and durability. It also involves problems in the
sensitivity of the elasticity of relative prices as its quantity changes. In our
models, we assume the commodity money enters the utility function as a
linear separable term. If we drop this assumption, new difficulties appear —
consider the following example of a sell-all economy where we show that the
commodity money can never be in suffiecient supply to support competitive
prices and distribution.
Suppose that initial holdings of three goods (by the three agent types) are







The first two goods are perishables, while the third good is a durable and
has been selected as the money. The second term is the expected utility of
the left over durable, where Π is an exogenous parameter. For the example
assume Π = 1
It is easy to see that the general equilibrium solution calls for symmetric
prices (  ) and a distribution of (1 1 1) of the commodities to each trader
type. Since the transaction structure is sell-all, and the game with money
is to achieve the CE outcome, each of the first two trader types would need
to borrow 2+ 1 units of the monetary commodity to buy the distribution
(1 1 1) But they only have an income of 3 each. Thus, if   1 the types
do not have enough money to pay back their loans. On the other hand, if
 ≥ 1, the lenders do not have 2 ∗ (2+ 1) in cash to lend.
Can this be cured by giving the money lenders more money? We answer
“no”, by virtually the same argument. Suppose the lenders had some amount
  3 We note that for an arbitrary  the competitive equilibrium prices




 ) and (1 1 
3
) respectively. The trader




in cash in order to buy the distribution (1 1 
3
).
They each have income . Hence if   1 the types do not have enough





) in cash to lend.
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4 Model 2: Trade with Demonetized Gold and
Transaction Strips
We now analyze the model of the above (buy-sell) economy after gold has
been demonetized. The physical asset gold is stripped of its monetary func-
tion. The old money lenders become paper money lenders/gold merchants.
We use the term “strips” here to suggest that when a real asset A has more
than one function, one might be able to modify the rules of the game to
strip A of that function, while creating object B that takes it over. The le-
gal modifications are many and subtle but the principle is relatively simple.
4.1 The three uses of monetary gold
A monetary gold has at least three uses:
1. A store of value (a property shared with all other durables)
2. A provider of consumption or production services (a property shared
with all other durables)
3. A provider of transaction services.15
At any particular time, a monetary gold can only provide one of the last
two services.
4.2 The Demonetization
A society that utilizes gold as money can switch to paper money, maintain
full ownership claims of all agents, and provide transaction services to its
members. It can accomplish this by stripping gold of its use in transactions
and giving all owners of gold a paper (or other) symbolic claim to the gold,
on a one-to-one basis. Thus against the  units of gold a piece of paper (a
“gold certificate”) inscribed with the legend “This is one unit of transactions
gold” can be used instead of the gold itself to provide payment.
Of course, the gold owners still have the gold, which has value as a
durable good (but not as a money). In an ideal world with no exogenous
uncertainty and no opportunity for any individuals to print more transaction
strips,16 the gold is now freed up for use in production or consumption
15A fourth use is as a numeraire and a fifth use is as scalar measure of value; but these
are not particularly germain to this discussion.
16Thereby violating the 1 : 1 relationship or the 100% reserves
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services, or to lease to others. And while the demonetization has stripped
their gold of its use in market transactions, the owners are given two financial
instruments that compensate for the loss. The first is the paper described
above. The second is a call on gold that can be exercised at the time of
settlement. For now we ignore the call feature, but we discuss it later in
Section 4.6.
In the new economy, the inital endowments now become ( 0) for
the Type 1 traders, (0 ) for the Type 2 traders, and (0 0 ) for
the paper moneylenders/gold merchants (hereafter called “lender-merchants”).
In each of these endowment vectors, the first two entries are the endowments
of the two perishables, the third entry is that of gold (now without its mon-
etary function), and the fourth entry is the amount of “strip” or separated
asset issued against the gold to replace it for transactions services. This is in
essence a 100% reserves system. The original Bank of Amsterdam appears
to have paid in notes backed by its gold in this manner.
The specifics of how the paper is issued are a matter of the rules of the
game, which depend upon the laws of the society. There are several ways in
which this can happen. Perhaps the most obvious is by means of a warehouse
receipt. An individual depositing an amount of gold is presented with a
warehouse paper receipt for that amount. But if this paper is non-negotiable,
it remains as two-party paper and cannot be utilized in transactions (because
it cannot be transferred to a third party). But this restriction is a matter
of the rules of the game – a legal system can recognize the legality of third
party utilization, at which point the warehouse receipts can be utilized as a
money if they are universally accepted in payment.
4.3 Demonetized Gold, No Central Bank
We modify the previous buy-sell economy (Model 1a). The initial conditions
have been specified above. There is now an extra market for gold, which is
also buy-sell. Thus, the traders must specify both the amount of perishable
they wish to put up for sale, as well as an amount of gold they wish to put
up for sale. All trade must be intermediated with paper money backed by
gold.






























Here the decision variables  and 3 denote the total amounts bid for good
2 and gold respectively,  and 3 the amounts of good 1 and gold put up for
sale respectively, and  is the amount of loan to be repaid to the lenders.17
The  and  are the prices for the two goods, 3 is the price of gold,  is
the interest rate on loans, Π1 is the per unit salvage value parameter for the
strips, and Π2 is the per unit salvage value for gold. Thus, the first term
above is the utility of consumption of the perishables, the second the utility
from the consumption value of the services of gold for the period, the third
term is the salvage (terminal) value for left over gold certificates, and the
last term is the salvage value for the asset gold. Since they are modeled as
non-depreciating durables, both gold and gold certificates will be left over
at the period of final settlement.18
The optimizations for the traders and the lender-merchants differ only
because their initial endowments. Technically, any individual holding gold
could lend the strips she is given and thus could have a lending strategy;
however we have specified our initial conditions to be such that the traders
would never lend and the lender-merchants would never borrow.








− − 3 +  + 33 −  ≥ 0 () (20)
 3  ≥ 0 0 ≤ 3 ≤  (21)
The constraints () and () are the cash flow and budget constraints as in
Model 1a.
The optimization problem for the Type 2 traders is similar.
The continuum of lender-merchants act both as consumers and as money-
lenders. Their decision variables are ∗1, 
∗
2 (the total amount they bid for
goods 1 and 2), ∗3 (the total amount bid they bid for gold), 
∗
3 (the total
amount of gold they put up for sale), and  (the total amount of gold strips
17We point out that the variables , , , 3, and 3 each represent aggregations of
identical individual traders’ strategies — see Section 3.1 for details.
18As before we note that a more precise model here covering all positions in the feasible
payoff space would also include a default penalty term; and that here we assume that
default penalties are so great that the traders are essentially forbidden to go bankrupt.
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3 ≥ 0 0 ≤ ∗3 ≤  (24)










3 + 3 + 
∗
3




while that for the interest rate is




We call the above “Model 2”.
4.4 An extra constraint concerning the sale of strips
In our formulation above a conceptual problem emerges concerning the sale
of strips. If a strip is backed by gold, then the money lenders cannot be
permitted to offer more strips than they have gold on hand — otherwise some
of their lending would be unbacked by the 100% reserves of this system. This
introduces the extra constraint
 ≤  − ∗3
This extra constraint is satisfied in all three examples below.19
19More generally, if there is a reserve requirement of  (expressed as a proportion), then
the extra constraint would be  ≤  − ∗3 . Since the three examples all satisfy this with
 = 1, necessarily they all satisfy this with any lower values of .
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4.5 Results
In Appendix B we solve the model, again for the case where  is small.
With small , we may assume the traders’ cash flow and budget constraints
are both tight. In addition, we may assume that the traders do not sell gold
(3 = 0) and the lender-merchants do not buy gold (
∗
3 = 0).
There are again two cases, depending on the value of. For higher values
of , we assume that the lender-merchants’ cash flow constraint is loose. In
the second case, with lower values of , we assume that this constraint is
tight, and that the gold market is inactive.
We now set parameter values so as to most closely match the three
examples calculated with Model 1a. To do this, we set Π1 = Π2 = 1,  = 0,
and consider the same three values of :
Example 1
If  = 2, we are in Case 1 above. Our calculations yield a continuum of




. For each such , we
have  =  = 1,  = 0,  =  = ,  =  = − , and the lender-merchants
lend  = 2. Hence the consumption by each trader type is (− −) of the
perishables. The bids of the lender-merchants are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 2 − , and so
they consume 2− of each of the perishables. In addition, we have 3 = 2,
3 = 3 = 2 − , and ∗3 = 2 − ; hence the lender-merchants sell 2 − 
units of gold (− 
2
to each trader type). The final distribution of resources is
(− − − 
2
 0), (− − − 
2
 0), and (2− 2− 3−2 2) for
the two trader types and the merchant-lenders respectively. For the traders,
their final utility is 2
p
(− )(− )+− 
2
+Π2(− 2 )+0 = , while for the
merchant-lenders it is 2
p
(2 − )(2 − )+(3−2)+Π2(3−2)+2 = 6.
These utilities do not depend upon the chosen value of .
Note that the consumption of perishable is Pareto efficient; recall in the
corresponding Example 1 of Model 1a it was not efficient. In fact we can
compare the final utilities to the agents in the two examples:









Model 2   6
Table 1
Finally, notice that here that for all values of  we have  ≤  − ∗3, so
the reserve requirement is indeed met.
Example 2
If  = , we are on the border of Case 1 and Case 2. There is now only
one equilibrium. Our calculations yield  =  = 1,  = 0,  =  = 2,
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 =  = 2,  =  = 2, and the lender-merchants lend  = . Hence the
consumption by each trader type is (2 2) of the perishables. The bids
of the lender-merchants are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 0, and so they consume none of the
perishables. In addition, we have 3 = 2, 3 = 3 = 0, and 
∗
3 = 0; hence









 0 0), and (0 0  ) for the two trader types
and the merchant-lenders respectively. Notice that here  ≤  − ∗3, so the
reserve requirement is indeed met.
Example 3
If  = 4, we are in Case 2. Our calculations yield  =  = 1
4
,  = 3,
 =  = 8,  =  = 32,  =  = 2, and the lender-merchants
lend  = 16. Hence the consumption by each trader type is 2 of their
“own” perishable, and 8 of the “other” perishable. The bids of the lender-





, and so they consume 3
8
of each of the perish-
ables. The gold market is inactive, i.e. the lender-merchants sell no gold to

















) for the two trader types and the merchant-lenders respectively.
This is not efficient.
4.6 The worth of strips at settlement day
At the day of settlement there is a modeling problem concerning end valu-
ation of the gold strips. If viewed as an experimental game, then the only
question to a player is how their left over paper money is treated. If con-
version to gold is not permitted, then all that matters is its salvage value.
Alternatively, if ownership of the paper money includes a call on the gold,
there is no reason to convert if the salvage value for the paper is the same
as that for gold. Thus these games, without and with convertability, have a
solution in common — namely where there is no conversion. This appears to
be double counting, but it actually reflects that both the transactions and
consumption values are being realized.
A different approach is to consider the infinite horizon version of the
game. Here the strip need never be cashed; hence it has the full transaction
value over all periods. At equilibrium, this transaction value is equal to the
full service value of the gold over all periods. [This is because at a stationary
state equilibrium, there can be no advantageous arbitrage opportunites — it
cannot pay for an individual with a strip to buy gold or vice-versa.] This
justifies our assumption (in the examples) of Π1 = Π2.
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4.7 Fractional Reserves
Drive for show, but putt for dough
Old golf saying
We have provided a painstakingly precise set of process models within
a grotesquely oversimplified economy, in order to show how in the case of
enough money, replacing gold by fully backed paper improves efficiency.
Our second model has 100% backed gold reserves. The gold strips match
the gold. The mathematics of this model does not justify fractional reserves;
we conjecture, but do not prove that the model can be modified to work for
the infinite horizon with no uncertainty with any fractional reserve ratio.
This problem is left for future work.
5 A Disclaimer on Uncertainty
In this paper we do not model uncertainty. We intend to provide a simple
example with uncertainty in a further essay, to illustrate that with any
exogeneous uncertainty, the meaning of “enough money” (and the ability to
supply it) becomes difficult to define, and depends upon the default laws
and the society’s overall willingness to absorb risk.
6 Model 3: Trade with Central Bank Control of
the Strips
A variation of Model 2 is offered where upon the demonetization of the gold
the strips are not given out to the the gold owners. Instead the society forms
a central bank that lends the strips. The bank in turn is owned by holders
of the gold, who receive shares in the bank but do not necessarily control it.
The original holders of the gold, who were moneylenders in both Model 1
and 2, now are simply dealers in gold, and we call them “gold merchants”.
6.1 The negotiability of bank shares?
In this model, the gold and bank shares are packaged together. The indi-
viduals holding the gold hold the shares. Another possibility is that the
shares are separately negotiable. This is a matter of choice in how a society
constructs the rules of the game, either by law or by custom, or by both.
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6.2 On natural persons, legal persons, and ownership
In a modern organized society there are two types of “legal persons”: a)
natural persons, and b) corporate entities, such as for profit firms, univer-
sities, hospitals, goverment agencies, etc. All legal persons who are not
natural persons are ultimately owned in some form by natural persons.20
Upon liquidation, their assets must be flowed through to their owners. This
even includes governments, although given the ongoing aspects of the nation
state this is essentially a fiction — the nation state rarely voluntarily “goes
out of business” — it more often ends with war or revolution.
With the luxury of an experimental game with given initial and terminal
conditions,21 we can define a game where at the settlement day the resources
of all legal persons who are not natural persons are turned over to the natural
persons who are the ultimate owners.
6.3 The central bank
In Model 3, all of the physical and ultimate ownership aspects of the economy
for the natural persons are the same as in Model 2. However, there is a
change in the number of agents and their strategic power. Instead of giving
all agents with gold the strips, a new legal person is created, the central
bank. The central bank is funded with all of the gold strips that have been
created, but it is owned by those who have supplied the gold backing for the
strips.
The initial holdings of the traders, the money lenders and the central
bank in this economy are: Traders of Type 1 ( 0 0); Traders of Type
2 (0  0); gold merchants (0 0  0 ); the central bank (0 0 0 +
2−( + 2)) where components of these vectors represent
1. the amount held of the first perishable good;
2. the amount held of the second perishable good;
3. the amount of gold held;
4. the amount of gold trading strips held;
20 In actuality an orderly liquidation of a society raely if ever takes place; thus the
liquidation of the central bank suggested is an accounting fiction that stresses ultimate
ownership, not control and lays stress on balancing the books.
21The terminal conditions at their simplest may be a fixed set of prices for remaining
resources, but they also could be books of instructions or algorithms based on the play of
the game.
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5. the shares held of the central bank.
As gold and central bank shares are traded together, we could easily
simplify the notation for the endowments. However, it is perhaps more
natural to leave gold and bank shares apart, to emphasize the two roles for
gold here — as a commodity and as a backing for paper money.
The balance sheet of the central bank has two items as indicated in Table
2
Assets Liabilities
 + 2 strips
 + 2 shares
 + 2  + 2
Bank balance sheet
Table 2
Next, we must specify how the central bank makes loans to the various
agents. The simplest mechanism is as before, with lenders putting up gold
notes and borrowing agents bidding for them; but here there is only one
lender (the central bank). In order to fully close the model, we need to
specify the motivation of the central bank. Is it profit maximizing (if so it
is a monopolist)? Is it a philanthropist concerned with the efficiency of the
society? In this model we treat the bank as a strategic dummy, which offers
 for loan no matter what.
Conceptually, there is complete freedom for the interest rate in this
model, including the taking on of negative values. While logically possi-
ble, an outcome with a negative  can be ruled out as not occuring in an
equilibrium state by using a simple arbitrage argument.
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Model 3 As in Models 1a and 2, we consider a buy-sell economy. The































− − 3 ≥ 0 () (cash flow constraint) (30)

1 + 
− − 3 +  − + 33 + ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (31)
 3  ≥ 0, 0 ≤  ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤  (32)
The only new notation here is the symbol “”, which stands for the
Type 1 traders’ share of the liquidation payout from the central bank. Also,
note that there is no “” in either the cash flow or budget constraint. This
is because there are now no gold certificates given to traders in recognition
of their endowments of  units of gold.






























− ̄− 3 ≥ 0 ()
̄
1 + 
− ̄− 3 + ̄̄ − ̄+ 33 + ≥ 0 ()
̄ 3 ̄ ≥ 0 0 ≤ ̄ ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤ 
The former money lenders have become gold merchants. Four of their
decision variables are as before ∗1 
∗
2 (the total amount they bid by for goods
1and 2), ∗3 (the total amount they bid for gold), and 
∗
3 (amount of gold they
put up for sale). They no longer have  (the total amount of gold strips lent
to traders) as a strategic variable. This has been taken over by the central











































− ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 ≥ 0 (∗) (34)
∗
1 + 






∗ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ∗3 ≤  (36)










3 + 3 + 
∗
3




while that for the interest rate is





In Appendix D we solve the model, for small values of . As in Models 1
and 2, we have two cases, depending on whether  is “large” or “small”.
Qualitatively, the difference between Case 1 and Case 2 is whether the mer-
chants’ cash flow and budget constraints both hold tightly, and whether the
gold market shuts down.
We now set parameter values so as to most closely match the examples
calculated with Models 1 and 2. So let us now set Π1 = Π2 = 1 and  = 0.
Example 1
If  = 2 we are in Case 1. We obtain  =  = 1,  = 0,  =  = 23,
 =  = 3,  =  = 23. Hence the consumption by each trader type is
(3 3) of the perishables. The bids of the merchants are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 3,
and so they too consume 3 of each of the perishables. In addition, we
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have 3 = 2, 3 = 3 = 3, and 
∗
3 = 3; hence the merchants sell 3

















  − 
3
 0), and (0 0 0 ) for the two trader
types, the gold merchants, and the central bank respectively. In addition,
the central bank makes no profit; hence  = ∗ = 0. For each trader type,




















+Π2( − 3 ) + 0 = 2.
The reader will note that these give the same (Pareto efficient) results
as in Model 2.
Example 2
If we set  = , we are on the boundary between Case 1 and Case 2.
We obtain  =  = 1,  = 0,  =  = 2,  =  = 2, and  =  = 2.
Hence the consumption by each trader type is (2 2) of the perishables.
The bids of the merchants are ∗1 = 
∗
2 = 0, and so they consume none of the
perishables. In addition, we have 3 = 2, 3 = 3 = 0, and 
∗
3 = 0; hence the









 0 0), (0 0  0), and (0 0 0 ) for the two trader types,
the gold merchants, and the central bank respectively. Again, the central
bank makes no profit; hence  = ∗ = 0.
Example 3
If we set  = 
4
, we are in Case 2. There are a continuum of equilibria,
parametrized by , which can take on any value between 0 and 3. For each
such , we have  =  = 1
4
,  =  = 
8
,  =  = 
8(1+)
, and  =  =

2







 ). Again, no gold is traded. The merchants bid 
8(1+)
for each
type of perishable, and end up consuming 
2(1+)
of each type of perishable.
Consumption of perishable is not efficient here. The “profit” for the central
bank () is 
4
, all of which goes to the merchants.
The last two models fall under the rubric of Dubey, Mascolell and Shubik
[1] they have noncooperative equilibria that give the competitive outcome
if there is enough money. If there is not enough money, even in equilibrium
the inequalities become binding. The definition of enough money although
mathematically well defined depends on institutional detail.
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7 The Value of Paper Money in an Economy with
Enough Gold
We say that an economy has “enough money” if there is enough money in
the economy to finance efficient trade, even if it takes zero-interest loans to
those with cash flow constraints. Suppose gold is the money, and gold also
has a linear utility as a commodity. If there is enough gold, the marginal
transactions value of gold must equal its marginal consumption value. These
both have to be equal to the money rate of interest. When paper money is
used, its marginal value in consumption is zero, thus when it is in sufficient
supply, its price is zero.
In the examples from Model 2, we selected parameters Π1 = Π2 = 1,
so the marginal consumption value of gold is 1.22 Indeed, the value of the
strips equals the marginal value of the services of gold, which equals 1.
When  =  the discounted value of the strip equals that of the gold.
When  = 2 the discounted value to the lender is zero, but the sum of the
discounted worth to the borrowers is still 2 It adds 
2
to each every period.
8 The Need for a Central Bank?
8.1 Results from our Analysis
Let us summarize our results from the “enough money” (Example 1) cases
above. First, in Model 1 (with gold as the money), we had inefficient con-
sumption of the perishables. However, the demonetization of gold via the
introduction of the strips permits one to “have one’s cake and have the bor-
rowers eat it”. Both the consumption and transaction services of gold can
be utilized simultaneously, and the consumption of perishable is efficient.
In Model 3 we introduce a central bank (under the legal fiction that it is
owned by the holders of the gold) which enables a government to control the
money supply while limiting the amount of paper in circulation to at most
a 1 : 1 ratio with gold. This third model is not only somewhat improbable,
but appears to make a libertarian case that the central bank is unneeded —
there is no change in efficiency as we move from Model 2 to Model 3.
Thus it seems that the central bank adds no value. But do not forget
our simple models assume a stationary economy, with perfect information
22 Interpreted in terms of an infinite horizon model, this fits with a time discount of




we can connect to the steady state.
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flows, costless accounting, safe keeping and many other transaction services.
They have no exogenous uncertainty, but with honest error-free individuals
in a society without public goods, with law and government provided free
of charge. At the very least, in the real world a central bank is useful in
policing some of these functions.
In addition, our analysis shows the central bank does help increase ef-
ficiency in the case where there is not “enough money”. For instance, in
Example 3 both Model 1 and Model 2 produce inefficient consumption of
the perishable. But Model 3 gives a continuum of results, ranging from the
Model 2 answer to an efficient result where  = 0.
8.2 Varying the money supply: Who gets the power?
Of course, our modern economy is not like our simple models here - we do
have a public sector with a bureaucracy, politics, law, and uncertainty as
facts of life. Hence a valid question is whether we should have a central bank
and paper money, or should we trust “the market” and the gold miners
to take care of everything. It poses a Scylla and Charybdis choice. The
choice is between an oligopolistic industry dependent on an arbitrary gold
manufacturing technology with relatively little flexibility in increasing or
decreasing the supply, and a monopolistist central bank that may be subject
to considerable political pressure. The answer is essentially ad hoc; but
sometimes the economy requires things like an ability to vary the supply of
money, a lender of last resort, a bank for the government, and a manager
of the national debt. In this case, the central bank, though possibly not
necessary, appears to be a sufficient institution that offers many, if not all
of these functions.
Possibly the most important question in the allocation of power to pri-
vate or public institutions is who is in position to vary the money supply in
the economy (see Smith and Shubik [6]). In considering a dynamic economy
it is easy to construct models in which the causality runs in both directions.
The availability of new products or processes may call for new money. Al-
ternatively the availability of funding may call forth innovation. Our formal
models above dealt with gold or paper as a means of payment where the
paper was competely backed by gold. As soon as the rules are changed in
a way that enables all legal persons to issue their own currency (see Sahi
and Yao [4] and Sorin [7]) it is possible to design an abstract economy and a
formal experimental game (see Huber, Shubik and Sunder ) which achieves
efficient trade using individual IOU notes as currency. The modeling re-
quirements are so stringent that although logically feasible the information,
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privacy, accounting and enforcement conditions rule it out at this time.
The central bank as the creator of money appears to be the least bad of
all current alternatives. But with this assignment of power goes public need
for transparency and safeguards.
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9 Appendix A: A Buy-Sell Model of Competitive
Money Lending with Gold
In this model there are the usual two continua of traders, plus a continuum
of moneylenders. The trader types are endowed with ( 0) and (0 )
respectively, while the lenders have (0 0 ). However, this time the money
is gold. The gold can only be used for transactions or for jewelry (services)
during the period, but not both. In the language of Quint-Shubik (2010,
Chapter 6), the parameter values (1 2 3) are set equal to (0 0 1).





























− +  −  ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (43)
  ≥ 0, 0 ≤  ≤  (44)











−  = (+Π) (46)








− +  −  = 0 or  = 0 (49)




























− ̄+ ̄̄ − ̄ ≥ 0 ()
̄ ̄ ≥ 0 0 ≤ ̄ ≤ 
28











− ̄ = (̄+Π)̄ (51)








− ̄+ ̄̄ − ̄ = 0 or ̄ = 0 (54)













+ − ∗1 − ∗2 −  +Π ( − ∗1 − ∗2 + ) (55)
s.t.  − ∗1 − ∗2 −  ≥ 0 (∗) (56)
∗1 
∗
2  ≥ 0 (57)
Note here that the money lenders have  as a decision variable, and not
. The reason is that individually, each lender can decide how much to lend
— but they cannot individually influence the interest rate. The first order
conditions here are: s
∗2
∗1
= Π+ ∗ + 1 (58)s
∗1
∗2
= Π+ ∗ + 1 (59)
Π− ∗ − 1 = 0 (60)
 − ∗1 − ∗2 −  = 0 or ∗ = 0 (61)







and 1 +  = +

.
Case 1: We first analyze the case where the traders have little gold and
the lenders have a lot. Thus the traders’ constraints are all tight and the
lenders’ are loose, i.e.   0,   0,   0,   0, and ∗ = 0. We also




Condition (60) gives  = 1
Π
. And (58) together with symmetry gives
1

= Π+ 1, which is  = 1
Π+1
= .





















= 1+Π++ = 1+Π+(+Π)−1+ = (1+)(+Π).
But  = 1
Π+1
; so we have (Π + 1)2 = (1 + )( + Π)2, which is (Π + 1) =
√




(+Π). Solving for  yields  =
p
Π(1 +Π)−Π.
Next, we again start with (46), which is
q

− = ( + Π)
3
2 . Squaring
both sides, we have 
− = ( + Π)





Π(1 +Π)−Π. We end up with  = (− ) Π
(1+Π)2
.
Next, since the traders’ cash flow and budget constraints are both tight,
we know  =  = 
1+Π
. But the tight cash flow constraint also means








































, and ∗1 = 
∗
2 =









the multipliers, we already found  =
p
Π(1 +Π)−Π =  and we are given








The results hold if  − ∗1 − ∗2 −  ≥ 0, i.e. if  − (1+Π)2 + Π + 2 −
Π
(1+Π)2





we need the variables , , and ∗1 = 
∗




Case 2: We analyze the case where  is smaller. Hence the traders’
cash flow and budget constraints are tight as before, but the lenders’ cash
flow constraints are tight, i.e.   0,   0, and ∗  0. Again assume a
symmetric solution, i.e.  = ,  = ,  = ,  = , and ∗1 = 
∗
2.
First, (60) implies ∗ = Π− 1. But also, from (58) and symmetry, we
have ∗ = 1









Next, since the traders’ cash flow and budget constraints are tight, we have
 = . But by the balance condition  is equal to  + ∗1, and since





. So we have














fourth equality follows from the balance constraint, the fifth is just algebra,
and the last follows from symmetry  =  and the tight traders’ cash flow




+ = . (64)
At this point, we can obtain expressions for all of the variables in terms
























), Recalling  = 1
Π(1+)
, we also have








= Π(1 + )(
2
+).
So now all that remains to find an expression for . To this end, we
observe that (47) implies that













































= Π2(1 + )4 (using 63) (70)
⇒ − 

= Π(1 + )2 (71)









= Π(1 + )2 (72)
⇒ −Π(1 + )(
2
+) = Π(1 + )(

2
+) +Π(1 + )2(73)
⇒ Π(1 + )2 + 2Π(1 + )(
2
+)−  = 0 (74)
The above quadratic expression for 1 +  solves in two cases: first, if
 = 0, we have 1 +  = 
Π(+2)
. Otherwise, if   0, we have
1 +  =
−Π( + 2) +
p
Π2( + 2)2 + 4Π
2Π
(75)



















where the second equality follows from (71) and the third from (63). Also,
 = (Π+ )− 1 = Π√1 + − 1. Finally, condition (60) directly gives us
∗ = Π− 1.
Note: In order for the above to be valid, we need  and all the multipliers
to be nonnegative. This requires  ≥ 1
Π
. In the case where  = 0, this
means  + 2 ≤ 
1+Π
. In the case where   0, the condition is not so
easily stated, but does hold whenever  is large compared to  + 2. We
also need for ∗1 and 
∗
1 to be nonegative, which means  ≥ 2. Again, if
 = 0, this holds if  ≥ 1
Π
, i.e. if  + 2 ≤ 
1+Π
. And again, if   0 the
condition is more complicated but holds if    + 2.
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10 Appendix B: A Sell-All Model of Competitive
Money Lending with Gold
Both trader types are endowed with  units of gold money. The continuum
of money lenders is endowed with  =  − 2 units of money (where
0 ≤ 2 ≤ ). The lenders are utility maximizers, who (just like the
traders) derive benefit from consumption of perishables, the service utility
of the gold, and the salvage utility of the gold at the end of the game.
The notation we will use is the following. For the Type 1 traders, 1
and 2 denote the amount of gold bid in the market for Good 1 and Good
2 respectively. The amount they borrow from the banks is 
1+
at interest
rate , so the amount they must pay back is . For the Type 2 traders, the
notation ̄1, ̄2, and ̄ is defined similarly. The prices for the perishables are
 and , while the salvage value for the gold is Π per unit. We assume that
the service utility of the gold is one per unit-time,



























− 1 − 2 + −  ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (78)
1 2  ≥ 0 (79)
The first order conditions wrt 1, 2, and  yields
2
1
= 1 +Π+ +  (80)s
1
2



















− 1 − 2 + −  = 0 or  = 0 (84)
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We also point out that we require the feasibility conditions (77)-(79) for
our solution.23



























− 1 − 2 + ̄− ̄ ≥ 0 (̄) (budget constraint) (87)
̄1 2  ≥ 0 (88)
The first order conditions here ares
2
1
= 1 +Π+ ̄+ ̄ (89)s
1
2



















− 1 − 2 + ̄− ̄ = 0 or ̄ = 0 (93)
The money lender decision variables are ∗1 (the amount they collectively
bid for Good 1), ∗2 (the amount they collectively bid for Good 2), and 











+ −  − ∗1 − ∗2 +Π( −  − ∗1 − ∗2 + (1 + ))(94)
s.t.  −  − ∗1 − ∗2 ≥ 0 (∗) (95)
∗1, 
∗
2,  ≥ 0 (96)
The first order equations here are
23For the Type 2 traders’ optimizations, and in Appendices B and C below, we also





= Π+ ∗ + 1 (97)s
∗1
∗2
= Π+ ∗ + 1 (98)
Π− ∗ − 1 = 0 (99)
 − ∗1 − ∗2 −  = 0 or ∗ = 0 (100)










and 1 +  =
+̄

. We also remark that here the problems for Types 1 and 2 are isomorphic
and so we may assume a symmetric solution where 1 = 2 = ̄1 = ̄2 ≡ ,
 = ̄, ∗1 = 
∗
2 ≡ ∗, and  = ̄.
Case 1:  low and  high.
There are several cases, but as before we first consider for the case in
which the traders have little money ( small) and the bankers have a lot of
money ( large). In terms of our multipliers, we are assuming , ̄, , and
̄ are positive, while ∗ = 0. The first observation is that condition (97)
or (98), ∗ = 0, and symmetry together imply that  =  = 1
1+Π
. Next,
conditions () and () holding tightly together imply that  = . Hence
 = 
1+Π
= ̄. The cash flow constraint holding tightly is + 
1+
− 2 = 0,







; but then condition (99) and ∗ = 0
together give  = 1
Π
















of each good. Then, we can calculate ∗ via the














of each good. They also lend an





Finally, for the multipliers, condition (80) with  = ̄ = 1
1+Π
and 1 = 2
gives 1 + Π = 1 + Π +  + ; since  and  are nonnegative, this gives
 =  = 0.
We remark that the above results are only valid if: (a) the above ex-
pression for ∗ is nonnegative, and if (b) the lenders’ cash flow constraints
(∗) hold. These gives the conditions: (a)  ≤ 
(1+Π)2








− 2, which is  + 2 ≥ 2
1+Π
.
Case 2:  low and  low. Now we cover the case in which , ̄, , and
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̄ are again all positive, but ∗  0 also. We first note that condition (97)
and symmetry together imply ∗ = 1

− 1− Π; substituting this expression
for ∗ back into (99) gives Π− (1






Next, we note from symmetry, the balance conditions, and the tight (∗)
constraint that  =
(1+)
2
, 2 + ∗ = , and ∗ = −
2
. Hence, starting
with the tight cash flow constraint for the traders, we have + 
1+
−− =
0 ⇒ + 
2
− 2 = 0 ⇒  + 
2
−  + ∗ = 0 ⇒ + 
2





= . Not only does this give an expression for , but this in




, or  = 2
Π(+2)
− 1.
It is now a simple exercise to calculate expressions for the other variables:
 =  = +2
2













= 1 = 2, 

















−1−Π−(Π+)+1⇒  = 0,
and  = 2
+2
−Π− 1.
In order for these results to hold, we need ∗ ≥ 0, ∗ ≥ 0, and  ≥ 0.
These hold if Π( + 2)2 ≤ 2 and (1 +Π) ≤ 2. If  = 0, all that is
needed is (1 +Π) ≤ 2.
11 Appendix C: Demonetized Gold, no Central
Bank, Lenders also act as Gold Merchants
This model is similar to Appendix A, except now the gold has been de-
monetized. All holders of  units of gold are now endowed with  units of
demonetized gold, plus  units of fiat (“gold strips”). Hence Trader Type 1
is now endowed with  units of good #1, plus  units of gold, plus  units
of fiat. Trader Type 2 is endowed with  units of good #1,  units of gold,
and  units of fiat. The lenders (now lender-merchants) are endowed with
only  units of gold and  units of fiat.
We assume that the financial market (for fiat) operates first, over the
time period [0 1]. This is followed by the goods markets for gold and for
perishable, both of which operate over [2 3] (0 ≤ 1 ≤ 2 ≤ 3). However,
while any money borrowed during the financial market is not obtained until
the end of the market at time 1, any gold or perishable bought during the
second phase is credited at the beginning of that phase, at time 2. This is
36
an important assumption for the trade of gold, as the final owners of gold
get to enjoy its service value over the period [2 3]. As in the previous
model, we assume 1 = 0, 2 = 0, and 3 = 1.
With the new market for demonetized gold, we have to define some new
variables. First, for the traders, the amount they bid for gold is 3. The
amount of gold they put up for sale is 3. For the lenders, the amount they
bid for gold is denoted ∗3, while the amount they put up for sale is 
∗
3. The
price of gold is given by 3 and the parameters Π1 and Π2 are the per unit
salvage value of strips (fiat) and gold respectively, at the end of the game.





































− − 3 +  − + 33 ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (105)
 3  ≥ 0, 0 ≤  ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤  (106)











−  = (+Π1) (108)
 = (+Π1) (109)
1 +Π2
3
= Π1 + +  (110)
Π13 − 1−Π2 + 3 = 0 (111)








− − 3 +  − + 33 = 0 or  = 0 (113)
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− ̄− 3 + ̄̄ − ̄+ 33 ≥ 0 ()
̄ 3 ̄ ≥ 0 0 ≤ ̄ ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤ 











− ̄ = (̄+Π1)̄ (115)
 = (̄+Π1) (116)
1 +Π2
3
= Π1 + +  (117)








− ̄− 3 + ̄̄ − ̄+ 33 = 0 or ̄ = 0 (120)
For the continuum of lender-merchants, the new decision variables are
∗3 (the amount the lenders bid for gold) and 
∗
3 (the amount of gold they






































3  ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ∗3 ≤  (124)
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The first order conditions here are:.s
∗2
∗1




= Π1 + 
∗ (126)
Π1− ∗ = 0 (127)
−Π1 + 1 +Π2
3
− ∗ = 0 (128)
Π13 − (1 +Π2) = 0 (129)
 − ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 −  = 0 or ∗ = 0 (130)













, and 1 +  = +

.
Case 1: We first consider the case where  is small and  is large, so
we assume the traders’ cash flow and budget constraints are both tight, but
the lender-merchants’ cash flow constraint is loose (∗ = 0). In addition, we
assume  is much smaller than , and so the lenders will be selling gold to
the traders. Mathematically, this means 3 = 3 = 0 and 
∗
3 = 0. However,
by doing this we may no longer assume conditions (111), (118), and (128).
We also assume a symmetric solution, i.e.  = ,  = ,  = ,  = ,
and ∗1 = 
∗
2.




But then (110) is  +  = 1+Π2
3
− Π1 = Π1 − Π1 = 0. Since  and  are
both nonnegative, this implies  =  = 0 =  = . But then (109) implies
 = 0. And then (127) gives ∗ = 0. And then (125) gives  = 1
Π1
= .
We can now get expressions for all of the other variables in terms of






















Next, Trader Type 1’s cash flow and budget constraints being tight to-
gether imply  −  + 33 = 0; the assumption that 3 = 0 further gives
 =  = 
Π1
. In addition, the balance condition for  gives  =  = + ∗1.





= ∗2. Also, the balance condi-
tion for interest 1+ = +

yields  = 2 (because of  = 0 and symmetry),
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so  = 2
Π1
. Furthermore, 3 = +

1+

























There is no way to pin down an exact value for , so we have a continuum
of solutions parametrized by . However, we can find upper and lower
bounds for , so that we end up with a “line segment” of solutions. First,
since ∗1 and 
∗
2 are nonnegative, we must have  ≥ 2 . But also the cash flow
constraint for the lenders must be satisfied, i.e.  − ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 −  ≥ 0.







≥ 0, or  ≤ 2+Π1
6
. In addition, we




the range for  is 
2





 ). In order for
this range to be nonempty we must have Π1 ≥  and (1 +Π2) ≥ 2Π1.
If one also requires a 100% reserve requirement for lending, i.e. −∗3 ≥




. There will be at
least one  to satisfy this (namely  = 
2





Case 2: Now we consider the case where  is smaller (but still sig-
nificantly larger than ). In this case, we assume that the gold market
goes inactive — so in addition to 3 = 3 = 0 and 
∗
3 = 0, we also assume
3 = 3 = 
∗
3 = 0. This means that we cannot use condition (110), (111),
(117), (118), (128), or (129) in our analysis. In addition, we assume all
trader and lender-merchant constraints are tight, including now the lender-
merchants’ cash flow constraints.
We begin with the tight traders’ cash flow constraints: + 
1+
−−3 =
0. Assuming 3 = 0, the balance condition 1+  =
2

, and simplifiying, this
yields + 
2
−  = 0. But the tight lender-merchants’ cash flow constraints
(plus symmetry ∗1 = 
∗
2) imply  =  − 2∗2; hence we have  + 2 − ∗2 −
 = 0. Next, the balance constraint for price implies  + ∗2 =  = ,
and furthermore the tight cash flow and budget constraitnts (plus assuming
3 = 0) imply  = . So +

2





Next, (125) together with symmetry implies that 1

= Π1 + 
∗ = Π1 +
Π1 = Π1(1 + ), where the second equality follows from (127). This is




Next, substituting (132), (133), and 3 = 0 into the tight traders’ cash
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) =  (134)





= Π1 +  + . Substituting in for 





= Π1 +  + (Π1 + ) = (1 + )(Π1 + ). Now

































, which is  = Π1
2( − ). Now the traders’ cash flow and budget
constraints being tight, together with the assumption 3 = 0 imply  = ;

















Equations (134) and (135) give two expressions for ; setting them equal















Once we know (= ), it is then a simple matter to compute  (and )









, and ∗1 = 
∗
2 from  =  − 2∗2. Consumption levels and final
utilities can then be computed accordingly. Finally, for the multipliers, we
may calculate ∗ from 1

= Π1 + 
∗,  from (108), and then  from (109).
In the special case of = 0, equation (136) solves easily, with  =  = 

.
We also get  =  = 
2
,  =  = Π1
2
2
,  = 
Π1
−1,  = Π12























− Π1). We note that in order for these quantities to be
nonnegative, we need for Π1 ≤ .
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12 Appendix D: Demonetized Gold with a Central
Bank
Now we assume the demonetization of gold in the presence of a central
bank. When the demonetization occurs, the holders of  units of gold are
now endowed just with  units of demonetized gold. The accompanying 
units of “gold strips” (fiat) go to the central bank. For the moneylenders of
the previous models, this means that they are endowed only with ( units
of) demonetized gold, making them “gold merchants”.
The central bank is a strategic dummy, lending an amount  of fiat no
matter what. It is essentially owned by the individuals of the society (the
traders and the merchants). Thus, at the end of the game, its profits are
divided up between the two types of trader and the merchants, in the ratio
of  to  to , reflecting the original ownership of the gold which backs
up the bank in the first place.
The traders of Type 1 are endowed with  units of gold, 0 units of fiat,

































− − 3 ≥ 0 () (cash flow constraint) (139)

1 + 
− − 3 +  − + 33 + ≥ 0 () (budget constraint) (140)
 3  ≥ 0, 0 ≤  ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤  (141)
Here the new quantity “” is the amount of fiat that comes back to
the Type 1 traders, as a result of their ownership of 
+2
of the profits of
the central bank. Also, note that here the cash flow and budget constraints
lack the quantity “” on the left hand side, reflecting that the traders now
are assumed to begin with gold but no fiat as compensation for their gold’s
demonetization.













−  = (+Π1) (143)
 = (+Π1) (144)
1 +Π2
3
= Π1 + +  (145)
Π13 − 1−Π2 + 3 = 0 (146)
In addition, we have the complementarity constraints

1 + 
− − 3 = 0 or  = 0 (147)

1 + 
− − 3 +  − + 33 + = 0 or  = 0 (148)






























− ̄− 3 ≥ 0 ()
̄
1 + 
− ̄− 3 + ̄̄ − ̄+ 33 + ≥ 0 ()
̄ 3 ̄ ≥ 0 0 ≤ ̄ ≤ , 0 ≤ 3 ≤ 
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− ̄ = (̄+Π1)̄ (150)
 = (̄+Π1) (151)
1 +Π2
3
= Π1 + +  (152)








− ̄− 3 + ̄̄ − ̄+ 33 = 0 or ̄ = 0 (155)
The gold merchants begin with  units of gold; but like the traders,
they begin with no fiat. They have been stripped of their former money
lending function. Instead, again like the traders, they have become money
borrowers — the new variable ∗ stands for the amount of loan (from the
central bank) that they must repay. And as a result, they also now have
a budget constraint, again just like the traders. Finally, they too have an
ownership stake in the central bank, namely 
+2
of its profits, which we










































− ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 ≥ 0 (∗) (158)
∗
1 + 






∗ ≥ 0, 0 ≤ ∗3 ≤  (160)
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The first order conditions here are:s
∗2
∗1
= Π1 + 
∗ + ∗ (161)s
∗1
∗2
= Π1 + 
∗ + ∗ (162)
(Π1 + 
∗)− ∗ = 0 (163)
−Π1 + 1 +Π2
3
− ∗ − ∗ = 0 (164)
Π13 + 
∗3 − (1 +Π2) = 0 (165)
∗
1 + 
− ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 = 0 or ∗ = 0 (166)
∗
1 + 
− ∗1 − ∗2 − ∗3 − ∗ + 3∗3 +∗ = 0 or ∗ = 0 (167)
The central bank is endowed with only  + 2 units of fiat. It is a
strategic dummy — it always just lends a total of  units of fiat to the
traders and merchants, where  is a given quantity with 0 ≤  ≤  + 2.
Its profits are , and so each trader type’s share is  = 
+2
, while
the merchants’ share is ∗ = 
+2
.
Next, we have the balance conditions a)  =
+∗1
















Finally, we make the same symmetry assumptions as usual:  = ,  = ,
 = ,  = , and ∗1 = 
∗
2.
We will consider two cases. In both cases,  is relatively small compared
to  and . Since the traders are starting with much less gold than the
merchants, we assume that the traders will not be selling gold to the mer-
chants, i.e. 3 = 3 = 0 and 
∗
3 = 0. Also, since the traders and merchants
both start with no fiat, we assume the cash flow constraints are tight for
both. In Case 1, the central bank lends out a relatively large amount of
money ( large). Since  is large compared to , we assume that when all
of the money is recycled back to the merchants they will have loose budget
constraints, so ∗ = 0. In Case 2 ( small) there is a lot less money in the
economy, so all constraints, for both traders and merchants, are tight.
Case 1:  small,  large
We first analyze the case in which the cash flow constraints (for both
types of traders and for merchants) are tight, and the budget constraints for
the merchants are loose (so ∗ is equal to zero), 3 = 3 = 0, and ∗3 = 0.
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The analysis of this case goes as follows. First, ∗ = 0 and (165) together
imply that 3 =
1+Π2
Π1
. Then (145) is 1+Π2
3




this reduces to + = 0. Since the multipliers  and  are both constrained
to be nonnegative, we have  =  = 0. Similarly,  =  = 0.
Next,  = 0 and (144) together imply  = 0. But this in turn implies
 = ∗ = 0. Also,  = 0 together with (163) implies ∗ = 0. And then
(161) plus symmetry imply 1

= Π1 + 
∗ + ∗ = Π1, so we have  = 1Π1 = .










 = −Π1 (168)
The next piece is to obtain an expression for . This will be a somewhat
long, tedious process. We begin by working with the budget constraint for
Trader Type 1: 
1+
− − 3 +  − + 33 + ≥ 0. Substituting  = 0,
3 = 0, and  = 0 yields  −  − 3 ≥ 0. But by balancing condition a)
 −  =  −  = ∗1, so we have
∗1 − 3 ≥ 0 (169)
But also, the budget constraint for the merchants is 
∗
1+
− ∗1 − ∗2 −
∗3 − ∗ + 3∗3 + ∗ ≥ 0. Substituting  = 0, ∗3 = 0, and ∗ = 0 yields
3
∗
3− ∗1− ∗2 ≥ 0, which (by symmetry) is 3∗3−2∗1 ≥ 0. But by balancing
condition c) (plus the assumptions 3 = 3 = 
∗
3 = 0 and symmetry) we have
3
∗
3 = 23, and so 23 − 2∗1 ≥ 0. But this and (169) together imply
∗1 = 3 (170)
Now look at the cash flow constraint for the merchants. We assumed it
was tight, i.e. 
∗
1+
− ∗1− ∗2 − ∗3 = 0. Substituting in  = 0 and ∗3 = 0, and
using symmetry gives ∗ − 2∗1 = 0, or ∗1 = 
∗
2
. But balancing condition d)
(with  = 0) gives ∗ =  −  −  =  − 2; hence ∗1 = −22 = 2 −  =

2
− − 3 = 2 − − ∗1. [In the previous, the penultimate equality follows
from the tight Trader 1 cash flow constraint (together with  = 0), while the












Now we are finally in a position to obtain our expression for . We
start with balancing condition a), which is  =  + ∗1. Substituting in
our expressions  = 1
Π1











The rest of the variables can now be easily obtained. First, using (171),













= ∗2. Because of (170), we also
immediately have 3 =
Π1−
3Π1








= . Then ∗ = 2∗1 =
2(Π1−)
3Π1












. For completeness, we also list all of the
other values previously found:  = 1
Π1
= , 3 =
1+Π2
Π1
, and  =  = ∗ =
 =  =  =  = ∗ = ∗ = 0.
Last, we should state the values over which our calculations are valid.
First, all of the calculated expressions for variables above must be nonneg-
ative; this requires  ≤ Π1 ≤ 4. Second, the above value for ∗3 must be




Case 2:  small,  small
Now we consider what happens when Π1  . In this case we assume
cash flow and budget constraints for both traders and merchants are all
tight, i.e. the multipliers , , , , ∗, and ∗ are all positive. The values
of ∗3, 3, and 3 from Case 1 (from the boundary case Π1 = ) lead us to
assume the gold trade market shuts down, i.e. in addition to our previous
assumptions of 3 = 3 = 0 and 
∗
3 = 0, we also have 
∗
3 = 3 = 3 = 0.











= (1+)(Π1+). But then



















= 1 +  (172)
Next, the balancing constraint for price is  =  − ∗1. But the tight (∗)










substituting this in the previous expression for  gives  =  − ∗
2(1+)
. But
the tight () constraint implies  = 
1+
; setting the last two expressions for









In addition, we may rewrite (172) as
(−)
1+
=  = 
1+









Next, the tight cash flow and budget constraints for the merchants together
imply that −∗ + 3∗3 + ∗ = 0. Now ∗3 is assumed to be zero, and ∗
is equal to 
+2
, so this reduces to ∗ = 
+2
. Next, the balance














. Hence, ∗ + 2 = (1 + ), and our previous expressions
(174) and (173) for  and  reduce to  = 2+
2












































Note that we have a degree of freedom in our solutions here, as all of our
variables are in terms of .
Finally, we obtain expressions for the multipliers. First, from (143)





























. To find ∗and ∗, we need to solve the two equations in two unknowns
given by (162) and (163). First, (163) gives us ∗ = (Π1 + ∗). Sub-
stituting this expression for ∗ into (162) and using symmetry, we have
1

= (1 + )(Π1 + 
∗), or ∗ = 1
(1+)
− Π1 = 
(1+)(+ +2)
− Π1. Then
∗ = (Π1 + ∗) = 
(1+)(+ +2)
.
In order for the results to be valid,  must be nonnegative, and the
above expressions for the multipliers  and ∗ must also be nonnegative.
Looking closely at these, we see that there will be a range for , with zero







is equal to 
Π1
. This range will be nonempty so long as
Π1 ≤ .
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